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Abstract: The interaction between brain and language has been investigated by a vast amount of research and different 
approaches, which however do not offer a comprehensive and unified theoretical framework to analyze how brain func-
tioning performs the mental processes we use in producing language and in understanding speech. This Special Issue ad-
dresses the need to develop such a general theoretical framework, by fostering an interaction among the various scientific 
disciplines and methodologies, which centres on investigating the functional architecture of brain, mind and language, and 
is articulated along the following main dimensions of research: (a) Language as a regulatory contour of brain and mental 
processes; (b) Language as a unique human phenomenon; (c) Language as a governor of human behaviour and brain op-
erations; (d) Language as an organizational factor of ontogenesis of mentation and behaviour 
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  “Huge benefit of a human which has a developed lan-
guage lays in the world doubling. With the help of lan-
guage which designate objects, he [human] can operate 
with objects which are not perceived directly and which 
do not belong to his experience … Human has a double 
world which includes the world of directly reflected ob-
jects and the world of objects, relations and properties 
which are designated by words. Thus, the word is a spe-
cial form of reality reflection. Human can voluntary 
name these images independently from their real exis-
tence … can voluntary control this second world” (Luria 
in Ref. [1], p.37) 
  “…a theory of language acquisition requires not only an 
understanding of signal processing abilities, but also of 
how these cues affect the innate linguistic endowment. 
The nature of the language endowment, once precisely 
established, will guide us towards an understanding of 
the biological foundation of language, and thus will 
clarify why we diverge so significantly from other 
primates. This in turn, will hopefully lead us to formulate 
a testable hypothesis about the origin and evolution of 
natural language.” (Mehler in Ref. [2], p.277) 
TIME TO REVIEW 
  An enormous number of research publications has been 
dedicated to the brain-language interaction issue and there-
fore not surprisingly the subject has become “saturated”. 
Many psychologists have adopted a viewpoint that ignores  
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the complexity of brain-language architecture and assumes 
that by focusing exclusively on speech perception and pro-
duction, a functional account of how language is processed 
will follow. At the same time, behavioural scientists believe 
that it is sufficient to study how language production and 
perception unfold during development to understand how 
syntax (or semantics) arises in the infant’s mind. Neurosci-
entists and psycholinguists (see for example ref. [3-7] have 
acquired extensive knowledge on the physical structures of 
the brain in relation to language production and processing. 
However, this knowledge by itself has so far not been able to 
provide a comprehensive picture of how brain functioning 
performs the mental processes we use in producing language 
and in understanding speech; instead it has just begun to re-
veal some specific elements of the interaction between brain 
and language. 
  The multiplicity and inconsistency of the various ap-
proaches therefore suggest the need to develop a general 
theoretical framework that allows researchers to handle the 
enormous amount of diverse observations related to brain-
language interaction. It follows that neuroscientific knowl-
edge should be complemented by the knowledge from the 
various fields of linguistics and related research fields (psy-
cholinguistics, sociolinguistics, semantics, discourse analy-
sis, etc.).  
THE IMPORTANCE OF JOINT BRAIN-LANGUAGE 
STUDIES 
  What should this theoretical framework look like to ade-
quately support phenomenal (mental), linguistic (neuro-
linguistic) and neurophysiologic data? We believe it should 
be a framework centred on the functional architecture of 
brain, mind and language. 
  To foster this view, we have prepared this Special Issue 
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now?”, in which we collate the numerous and diverse ap-
proaches to brain and language into a comprehensive body 
of knowledge, articulated along what we believe to be the 
main dimensions of research: (a) Language as a regulatory 
contour of brain and mental processes; (b) Language as a 
unique human phenomenon; (c) Language as a governor of 
human behaviour and brain operations; (d) Language as an 
organizational factor of ontogenesis of mentation and behav-
iour. 
Language as a Regulation Contour of Brain and Mental 
Processes 
  According to the tradition of the Russian psychophysi-
ological school founded by Luria (ref. [8]) and Vygotsky 
(see ref. [9]) psychology as systemic property of physiology 
can be studied only by considering the special genesis of all 
mental functions – the “regulation language contour” which 
is the highest level of the brain organization of all mental 
processes. This idea was supported by the work of another 
great Russian psychophysiologist Ukhtomsky [10] who de-
veloped the concept of higher cortical dominantas where 
language/speech is considered as a cortical dominanta of a 
special kind which can change the whole behaviour of the 
human. Indeed, from neuropsychology we know that during 
aphasia not only is speech disturbed but the whole behaviour 
of the patient also changes. For example, such patients are 
characterized by the disruption of higher forms of action.  
  Recent studies bring experimental evidence that language 
can restructure cognition [11,12]. Findings from recent 
neuroimaging studies suggest that activation of the speech 
motor system during lipreading enhance speech perception 
by tuning, in a top-down fashion, speech-sound processing in 
the superior aspects of the posterior temporal lobe (see 
contribution of Jääskeläinen to this Special Issue). 
Kobayashi  et al. [13] demonstrated that people recruit 
different linguistic and cognitive resources depending upon 
the language used to process Theory of mind
1, thus 
suggesting that switching language switches mind (see 
contribution of Kobayashi Frank to this Special Issue). From 
an evolutionary point of view, the progressive evolution of 
language from a simple form to a more sophisticated one 
(speech, writing, mathematics, science, computing and 
finally the Internet) can be seen as a response to the chaos of 
the information overload that each form of language 
contributed to generate: a response based essentially on a 
continuous re-shaping and development of human cognitive 
capacities (see contribution of Logan to this Special Issue).  
Language as a Unique Human Phenomenon 
  Besides the fact that language/speech plays an important 
role as a regulation contour of all mental processes, it is also 
a unique human phenomenon [2,14]. According to Vygotsky 
[9,15] the human brain is characterized by specific relations 
between structural and functional units of neural activity 
which are mediated by language/speech (high cortical domi-
nantas by Ukhtomsky [10]). Thus, the human brain has a 
new systemo-localisation principle according to which it 
became an organ of human consciousness. Specifics of 
                                                 
1 Theory of mind (ToM) – the ability to understand mental states of others (such as 
belief, desire, intention and knowledge) that enables us to explain and predict the 
behaviour of others.   
dominant mechanisms of the human brain are determined by 
extracortical genesis and ontological development of the 
human mind on the basis of new semantic codes of informa-
tion perception and processing [16]. 
  Experimental evidence, reviewed by Mehler et al. [2], 
suggests that only humans, and no other animals, acquire the 
language spoken in the surrounds and only human infants 
use the acoustic properties of speech to acquire grammar. 
Even though apes and also dogs have ‘lexicons’ that can 
attain a few dozen words [17,18], such abilities are insuffi-
cient to enable non-human animals to construct a grammar 
comparable to that of humans. ‘Ape language’ should not be 
called a language, because there is no convincing evidence 
of syntactic structures or word orders in ape language. Ac-
cording to critical assessment of a chimpanzee’s signs, the 
mean length of each utterance is no more than 1.6 words, 
and even longer utterances lack rule-governed combinations 
of signs [19]. Even when trained to use communication sys-
tems, apes, dolphins or parrots do not master anything re-
motely approaching the power and versatility of human lan-
guage. One of the most obvious differences is the almost 
total lack of what George Miller [20] called combinatorial 
productivity – our ability to recombine words or syllables in 
new ways to derive entirely new meanings. And none of 
these communication systems have more than tiny amounts 
of syntax, whereas grammatical rules of one sort or another 
are universal in human languages (a mathematical explana-
tion – based on a joint thought -language architecture – of 
why animals do not talk and think as people do, is given by 
Perlovsky and Ilin in this Special Issue). 
Language as a Governor of Human Behaviour and Brain 
Operations 
  Language is not only means of communication and the 
basis for verbal, discursive thinking, but also an important 
means of governance of human behaviour. Language medi-
ates different components of practical actions [21]. For ex-
ample, the grammatical class of words affects visual analysis 
and motor control differently [22]. Moreover, lan-
guage/speech creates new forms of attention, memory, 
imagination, thinking and action. In other words, the system 
of words is a powerful factor which forms mental activity 
[15]. Inner speech
2 has been shown to be involved in such 
important processes for behaviour as verbal self-guidance 
and self-regulation [24], problem-solving [25], planning 
[26], and memory [27]. Some psychological disorders such 
as anxiety and depression are mediated by dysfunctional 
self-talk [28] (for a review, see Ref. [29]). 
  Recent findings support the simulation based theories of 
language processing in an embodied framework
3, and pro-
vide a strong reason to link findings from the cognitive neu-
roscience of language processing to the neurophysiology of 
eye (and generally motor) movement behaviour (see contri-
bution of Singh and Mishra to this Special Issue). 
  Word as a “signal of signals” [31] is mediated by a strong 
dominanta’ mechanism (Ref. [10], p. 259). Heard or verbal-
ized word creates a special dominant setting of integrated 
                                                 
2 Inner speech is usually defined as the activity of silently talking to oneself [23]. 
3 Embodied and simulation based approaches to language comprehension predict that 
comprehension of language triggers mental simulation of events and objects as 
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brain areas; this dominant setting constitutes a new integral 
subjective image and forms simultaneous modification of 
perception [10,32]. These and many other observations point 
to the joint brain-thought-language functional architecture. 
For the elaboration of this issue see contribution of 
Benedetti, Marchetti, Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts to this 
Special Issue. Mathematical modelling of joint thought-
language architecture resolves long-standing issues as to 
how the brain learns correct words-object associations; and 
explains a contradiction between human ability for rational 
thoughtful decisions and the irrationality of human thinking 
(see contribution of Perlovsky and Ilin to this Special Issue). 
  It is important to note that structures of consciousness as 
a “reflection of reflection” in some sign form do not simply 
isomorphically duplicate the initial content, but add to and 
enrich it by introducing new connections and relations. Be-
hind the word there is a collective public experience which is 
concentrated in the crystallized form of meaning [33]. Due to 
language humans can acquire a knowledge of each other and 
the experience of previous generations (see contribution of 
Logan to this Special Issue). The existence of grammatical 
language structures which are isomorphic to action structures 
enables humans to perform mental experimenting and to 
acquire new knowledge mentally. 
Language as an Organizational Factor of Ontogenesis of 
Mentation and Behaviour 
  During ontogenesis new psychological systems are 
formed on the basis of verbalization of attention, memory, 
actions and thinking: for example, some aspects of language 
highly influence the development of Theory of Mind capaci-
ties (see the contribution by Kobayashi Frank to this Special 
Issue). Thus, according to Vygotsky [15] after a child has 
developed a language, he/she adds to the first-order stimuli 
(manipulation of objects), stimuli of the second-order, which 
are not the objects themselves, but are the means for organiz-
ing and planning human behaviour. This process results in a 
total reconstruction of all the mental functions of a human, 
giving him/her freedom of behaviour in relation to situation. 
Hence, the human being is freeing himself from the property 
of animal perception – being a “slave of a visual field”. With 
the help of “planning speech”
4 the conception about future 
(an actual future field) is inserted in human activity and, 
thus, behavioural impulsivity is controlled. Human conscious 
awareness, according to Vygotsky [15], is characterized by 
the fact that it is not based on the limitations imposed by the 
simultant structure of the visual field (which is a characteris-
tic of animal cognition), but rather by the successive struc-
ture of “the verbalized dynamic field of attention” which is 
achieved on the basis of inclusion of the regulation speech 
contour: the “attention field” is separated from the “percep-
tion field” and is unfolding in time dynamics.  
  New forms of human behaviour are originated on the 
basis of inclusion of speech formulas of past and present 
situations in a single focus of attention. “Speech forms op-
eration based on laws that are different from those character-
istic of actual action: it joints, unites, synthesizes past and 
present” (Ref. [9], p. 48). “Thus, the sign initially acts as a 
means of social connection in the behaviour of the child, as 
                                                 
4 The planning function of language [1,8] has been discussed and elaborated by Das’s 
group [34]. 
an intermental function; subsequently it becomes a means of 
controlling his/her own behaviour and he/she just transfers 
the social relation to a subject inward into his personality” 
(Ref. [9], p. 41). 
  A review of experimental evidence [2] suggests that hu-
mans are endowed with a species-specific disposition to ac-
quire natural language. Thus, irrespective of whether the 
learner is hearing and seeing, deaf or even blind, he/she will 
still attain a grammar that is as rich and complex as we ex-
pect it in humans without sensory filters (see [35,36] 
amongst others). Moreover, the infant’s brain preferentially 
processes speech, rather than non-speech stimuli [37]. And, 
finally, the work of Dehaene-Lambertz et al. [38] showed 
that responsible cortical regions are active well before the 
infant has acquired the native language. 
AIM OF THE SPECIAL ISSUE 
  The objective of this Special Issue is to collect a com-
pendium of articles which would help to bridge the gap be-
tween higher-order reflective or linguistic thought, semantic 
processing and brain activity. A key goal of this Special Is-
sue is to foster interaction among neuroscientists and lin-
guists and promote the development of cutting-edge ideas 
related to research issues on Brain, Mind and Language Ar-
chitectures. 
  Contributions from leading experts of the field provide a 
cutting-edge review of this challenging frontier of neurosci-
ence. We hope it will help interested researchers become 
familiar with research achievements and open new direc-
tions. It should also help to stimulate the interest of scientists 
to design new experiments and devise new concepts. 
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